Photo post by @biblioklept. Source: Untitled — Zdzisław Beksiński
The Neurotic Turn, edited by Charles Johns and featuring the work of Graham Harman, Nick Land, and John Russon among others, is where my most recent work, “the Neurotics of Yore” will be published. In this upcoming book selected scholars will present different re-conceptualizations of the once-popular idea of Neurosis in a philosophical register. This is a tentative “Table of Contents” (my emphasis)
Conrad Hamilton – Neurosis in America
Charles Johns – The Neurotic Turn
Mike Ardoline – Neurosis and the Impossibility of Meta-Philosophy
Dany Nobus – Antrozoological Neurosis: On the Trials of Domestication and the Psychology of Happy Pets
Nick Land – Neurosys: On the Fictional Psychopathology of Abstract Horror
Christopher Ketcham – Neurosis: Asymmetry and Infinity
Mohammad-Ali Rahebi – The Neurotics of Yore
Katerina Kolosova – Anorexia Nervosa and Capitalism
Graham Harman – Freud’s Wolf Man in an Object-Oriented Light
Sean McGrath – A Schellingian Take on the Difference between Neurosis and Psychosis
John Russon – Neurosis
Patricia Friedrich – Neurosis, Obsession and Dis-identification relief
Bernardo Kastrup. – Physicalism and Neo-Darwinism as Neurotic Defense Mechanisms
Roderick Orner – Stepping Beyond Our Omnipotence: Neurosis As Branding The Incomprehensible
Petteri Pietikainen – Magic and Loss: Modalities of the Nervous Mind
My next post will introduce the themes of my own contribution to the book.
This is the most recent work by Charles William Johns, the editor of The Neurotic Turn, an anthology featuring selected scholars (among them Graham Harman and Nick Land; also myself) reinventing the concept of neurosis for a philosophical afterlife.
Neurosis and Assimilation is Johns’s third book to deal with neurosis and its re-conceptualization. As part of my research on the subject, I will be referring to this book for the novel insight it affords by discontinuing the monopoly of psychoanalysis over the notion of neurosis and re-purposing it as a tool of philosophy.
Here is the abstract:
This book deals with the possibility of an ontological and epistemological account of the psychological category ‘neurosis’. Intertwining thoughts from German idealism, Continental philosophy and psychology, the book shows how neurosis precedes and exists independently from human experience and lays the foundations for a non-essentialist, non-rational theory of neurosis; in cognition, in perception, in linguistics and in theories of object-relations and vitalism. The personal essays collected in this volume examine such issues as assimilation, the philosophy of neurosis, aneurysmal philosophy, and the connection between Hegel and Neurosis, among others. The volume establishes the connection between a now redundant psycho-analytic term and an extremely progressive discipline of Continental philosophy and Speculative realism.
See also the Springer’s own page.
Abstract of a chapter of Mittelstadt and Floridi’s Ethics of Biomedical Big Data. Although accepted, this chapter was never finished. The abstract was written in April 2015.
In this chapter I will attempt to show how the rise of Big Data necessitates a drastic revision of the notion and elements of informed consent. The “Fourth Paradigm” and its concurrent biomedical practices, such as data-driven science, the automation of Evidence-Based Practice, have changed the very foundation of the biomedical sciences, changes that must be also reflected in their ethics.
The most important change of perspective brought about by these new forms in medical practice is the proliferation of statistically observed, evidence-based treatments and protocols that promise great efficiency. In light of the ever-growing flood of data, the question becomes, can the physician provide adequate information for the patient’s informed consent when she does not know the mechanism of action of the treatment under discussion? Or rather, what are the contents of the information that must be provided regarding the treatment? Is that information only composed of data: statistical rates of success or side-effects, or does it necessarily contain some form of (subjective) medical expertise or scientific aspect that is not equivalent to data?
The question “can the physician explaining the treatment to the patient be replaced with graphical representations of available data” is not a rhetorical one after the “fourth revolution”. The ever-increasing amount of automated evidence-based practice will necessarily incapacitate the physician from gaining and providing subjective and expert information on newer treatments. Taking things even further, we will find ourselves faced with the fact that the same acceleration and increment of data will put efficient treatment forever ahead of the scientific, causal explanation of the condition and its treatment and the discovery of its mechanism of action. Whether or not this will render the theoretical aspects of biomedical sciences obsolete and trivial remains to be seen, but one thing is certain: the possibility of confounding has increased as never before. The issue cannot be reduced to a rehashing of the “computers make errors” cliché; the wide-spread forms of “epistemological uncertainty” (Renee Fox) point to a much more paradigmatic problem. In fact the most important reason for worrying about the insufficiency of data-based consent and the possibility of confounding is that there are no reasons to be concerned about it. The point is, the increasingly efficiency/performance based attitude of the biomedical sciences translates into the prioritizing of proficiency and efficiency in prediction over scientific verity.
Given all of these considerations, a revision of the content of the information necessary for the patient’s informed consent is exigent. I believe it is high time we ask ourselves where we stand with the data/information problem, since surely lives are at stake.
Originally written as an abstract for a conference in May 2015.
There is a deep affinity between the dead and the machinic when it comes to creativity, the creation of novelty; an affinity that is not reducible to their shared character of non-life. If creativity is the creation of an alterity, an act of spontaneity and a whim through which an other “without genealogy” (Malabou 2012, p. 3) comes to be, and if an organ(ism) creates itself into something new through an instant of self-determination, then by necessity that acts is a near-death experience; there is something of death in every spontaneous (self)creation. Spinoza mentions the zombie-poet Góngora, in his illustration of a death that is not actually dying but the emergence of new structures, new “ratios of motion and rest” (Spinoza and Parkinson 2000) between the parts, of novelty in a body that can no longer be the same. The amnesiac is a popular and necessary figure in the anthropology of creativity, yet one which pales against the cybernetic machine.
Presented at the London Conference of Critical Thought in June 26, 2015
At the heart of “big data ideology” lies its claim to an immanence (to the very lives of persons) of which human thought is incapable. It is with reference to the computational ability of real-time data processing that the proponents of big data advertise a sense of humanity and singularized individuality (personalized ads, precision medicine) without the inevitable bias of subjective human thought. It is in the name of this immanence, as Rouvroy noted, that reflective, critical thinking is short-circuited as transcendent and obsolete, if not “dangerous” or “reactionary”. The elimination of reflection is far from limited to the sphere of government/governance: It is the same claim to immanence (a principle of the cybernetic organon of which big data and algorithmic governmentality are the most recent manifestation)that underlies the so-called “fourth paradigm” in the sciences, replacing causal and explanatory theorization with real-time predictive modeling where hypotheses are replaced with transfer functions and parameter setting. As more scientific objects are being replaced with black boxes of high “reliability,” the question of truth as well as the questions of why and what are laid aside, and with them the human capacity of critical reflection. Assisted (read assailed) by data-based decision algorithms of all kinds and bombarded with visual stimuli, the thinking subject is short-circuited as data is connected directly to her unconscious body, desublimating desires into drives. The dividual celebrated as the digital savior of neoliberalism gives new meaning to Guattari’s concept of “machinic enslavement.”